

Public

Electricity Markets Advisory Council

19 March 2026

Agenda

Item	Lead	Time
<i>Informal lunch and networking (optional)</i>		12:00 – 13:00
Welcome	Lizzie Blaxland (NESO)	13:00 – 13:05
DESNZ IEM Update	Ronan Devaney & Ashley Hibben (DESNZ)	13:05 – 13:35
RNP Call for Input Update	Rein de Loor, Danny Taylor & Stuart Miller (NESO)	13:35 – 14:25
<i>Break</i>		14:25 – 14:35
DESNZ RNP Update	Simon Rickenbach (DESNZ)	14:35 – 14:45
Constraint Management Markets Update and Demand for Constraints	Saskia Barker & Alifa Starlika (NESO)	14:45 – 15:35
Preview of Electricity Markets Roadmap and Operability Strategy Report	Thomas Pownall (NESO)	15:35 – 15:55
Close and Next Steps	Lizzie Blaxland (NESO)	15:55 – 16:00



DESNZ IEM Update

Ronan Devaney & Ashley Hibben
(DESNZ)

RNP Call for Input Update

Rein de Loor, Danny Taylor &
Stuart Miller (NESO)

Context

Purpose of today

- Share emerging industry views and feedback on the RNP balancing reforms from our engagement so far, and how we are taking this into account in our assessment
- Deep dive on dispatch reform to establish shared understanding of (i) the case for change, and (ii) spectrum of reform options

Context

Industry engagement throughout

Call for Input

- Gather industry feedback and views on the balancing, settlement and dispatch reforms through the Call for Input
- Set up an Industry Expert Panel which will help shape the reforms and their implementation
- Engage with industry to build a shared understanding of the reforms and their impacts


We are here

Assessment of reforms

- Review and incorporate Call for Input responses into our assessment
- Work with industry to undertake Cost-Benefit Analysis and an implementation assessment of the balancing reforms
- Determine case for dispatch reform and develop reform options for assessment

Recommendation


- Provide a recommendation to the RNP programme, considering the CBA, implementation assessment, and industry responses

Context





Balancing and dispatch reform

Balancing and dispatch arrangements must support a secure and cost-effective clean power system, efficient investment and provide enduring value for consumers. This must balance:

- Maintaining system reliability and operability
- Operating the system at lowest cost to consumers
- Supporting decarbonisation objectives



Balancing and dispatch challenges

-  Operability and cost challenge from increasing redispatch
-  Insufficient visibility of, and access to, balancing resources
-  Overlap between the wholesale market and balancing
-  Distorted wholesale price signals, and incentives to exacerbate system constraints



Balancing reform

- Lower mandatory BM participation threshold
- Alignment of the market trading deadline with Gate Closure
- FPNs that must match traded positions
- Unit-level bidding
- Shorter Settlement Period


Dispatch reform

- Explore dispatch reform options with a view to improving system operability and reducing consumer costs

Our engagement so far



- Used the Operational Transparency Forum to present an overview of the Call for Input, what feedback we are after, and how to get involved



- Presenting to trade organisations, allowing for targeted discussion on most relevant reforms and impacts
- Direct conversations with impacted stakeholders, such as Power Exchanges and Elexon



- We ran a Technical Questions Webinar on 17/03/26, allowing industry to directly engage with the NESO team and ask questions
- 245 attendees across 120 different organisations, and 77 questions received

What stakeholders are saying

Stakeholders asked

NESO response

Evidence, proportionality and case for reform

- The strength and transparency of the evidence base underpinning RNP proposals (e.g. NIV chasing, impacts of P342, FPNs vs outturn).
- Whether issues can be empirically demonstrated, particularly around constraints being exacerbated by trading behaviour.
- Whether proposed interventions are proportionate to the problems identified, or risk over-correcting.
- There is also scepticism about whether moving the market trading deadline improves efficiency or reduces costs, versus increasing risk and liquidity.

- Structural changes in the system (more flexible assets, fewer assets bound by PNs, more constraints) have materially impacted system operability.
- While some behaviours may be welfare-enhancing in unconstrained network conditions, they can increase balancing actions and costs under congestion.
- The Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) is the proposed vehicle to test proportionality, quantify trade-offs, and validate assumptions.

Market impacts and liquidity

- Wholesale and intraday liquidity, especially the role of non-physical traders (NPTs).
- Whether reforms (e.g. FPNs matching traded positions, unit-level bidding, aligning market trading deadline) could:
 - Reduce arbitrage opportunities,
 - Undermine liquidity,
 - Harm investability.
- Some stakeholders express concern for impact on certain business models and the balance between system operability and market functioning.

- Market impacts are central to the assessment, but in some cases depend on the specific reform options taken forward.
- There is no intent to exclude NPTs or undermine the role of trading; rather, we are looking at how trading activity can align better with physical system needs (but must also reduce consumer costs).
- We recognise there are trade-offs:
 - Increasing certainty and visibility for NESO to balance the system against market liquidity and flexibility.
- Wholesale market impacts will be tested within the CBA.
- Industry expertise is essential, hence there will be continued industry engagement throughout, and we have the Expert Panel.

What stakeholders are saying

Stakeholders asked

NESO response

Design choices

- Questions focus on specific design elements, including:
 - Lowering the BM participation threshold and associated registration costs.
 - FPNs matching traded positions versus simply improving visibility of trades.
 - Shorter Settlement Periods (e.g. 5-minute SP) – rationale, cost, and implementation risk.
 - Dispatch reform options, including co-optimisation of energy and ancillary services, and why certain models were ruled out or revisited.
- Stakeholders asked whether: Reforms address root causes (e.g. NIV chasing), or introduce complexity, risk and operational burden

- Different reforms have distinct objectives:
 - We recognise the challenges for smaller market participants of BM entry and will seek to introduce improvements where we can
 - We are considering the benefits of visibility alone, vs requiring matching of physical and traded positions
 - A 5-minute SP provides the more granular temporal signal but comes with cost and complexity trade-offs.
- Across design questions:
 - Multiple options are being explored and to be determined in collaboration with industry.
 - Final design choices will depend on CBA results and implementation assessments.

Process, governance and industry engagement

- Process credibility and sequencing, especially concerns that CBAs or assessments are starting before industry input is complete.
- Transparency over:
 - Who conducts the CBA (internal vs external),
 - How conflicts of interest are managed,
 - How stakeholder views influence methodologies and assumptions.
- Decision-making responsibilities between NESO, DESNZ and Ofgem, including timelines and routes to implementation (code vs legislation).

- The Call for Input is not a consultation on fixed proposals.
- Industry input will feed into:
 - Reform option development,
 - CBA methodologies,
 - Assumptions and sensitivities,
 - Implementation planning and impact assessments.
- NESO's position is that:
 - CBAs will be conducted by a third party, under NESO oversight, with full transparency of analysis.
 - Governance and final decisions sit with DESNZ and Ofgem, with NESO advising.
 - Continued industry engagement is required as options narrow and evidence develops.

Dispatch reform: Case for reform

“We believe that there is more that could be done to meet the overall RNP objectives, and particularly the operability and cost challenge from high levels of redispatch”

NESO RNP Call for Input

- The **proposed RNP Balancing Reforms** are expected to **provide some significant benefits**:
 - Increased supply and competition for balancing the system;
 - A clear handover of balancing responsibility between market participants and NESO;
 - Market rules that facilitate fair, efficient and transparent market
- However, even with the proposed balancing and wider RNP reforms, the **fundamental misalignment** between the **national wholesale price and locational system needs will remain**
- Significant NESO intervention could still be needed to unwind self-dispatch market positions to maintain system security; this could be **significantly challenging, inefficient, and expensive**, in turn having a **direct impact on consumer bills**

Key - theorised impact

- Significant impact
- Limited impact
- Moderate impact
- No impact

Balancing and dispatch reform challenges	Balancing reforms				
	Lower BM threshold	Align MTD with Gate Closure	Unit-bidding	PNs=traded Position	Shorter Settlement Period
Operability and cost challenge from increasing redispatch	□	□	□	□	■
Insufficient visibility and access to balancing resources	■	■	□	■	□
Overlap between the wholesale market and balancing	■	■	□	■	□
Distorted wholesale price signals, and incentives to exacerbate constraints	□	■	■	□	■

Challenges not resolved by RNP self-dispatch

1 **High redispatch volumes and balancing costs**


2 **Reliance on countertrading and European TSOs**

3 **Inefficient scheduling of storage assets**

- 1
- National pricing and self-dispatch simultaneously:
 - Provides poor incentives to market participants to operate in line with network constraints; and
 - Inherently limits NESO's ability to co-ordinate and re-dispatch such assets effectively.
 - Two-way assets frequently receive the "wrong" price signal, leading them to be scheduled in a way which exacerbates, rather than alleviates, constraints.
 - This needs to be resolved by NESO close to real-time in the BM, which is inherently unsuited to the co-ordination and redispatch required

Balancing cost history and projections

Balancing costs are projected to stay at historic highs, despite significant transmission network build-out



Challenges not resolved by RNP self-dispatch

1

High redispatch volumes and balancing costs

2

Reliance on countertrading and European TSOs


3

Inefficient scheduling of storage assets

2

- Clean Power 2030 modelling projects that redispatch volumes could be up to 50% higher in 2030 compared to 2024, and interconnector redispatch volumes could be 500% higher than today, even with the recommended network build outlined in the CP30 report.
- Interconnector modelling is sensitive to assumptions and price forecasts from neighbouring countries; however, these figures illustrate the potential scale of future interconnector redispatch.
- If we were unable to redispatch the required volume on interconnectors, then we may need to rely on unabated gas generation at high cost to manage these volumes, assuming it's available.

Historic and projected interconnector redispatch



Interconnectors and storage make up ~50% of GB demand in CP2030

- CP2030 modelling assumes:
- 12GW/80TWh of interconnectors
 - 30GW/70TWh of BESS and LDES
 - 315TWh of demand

Challenges not resolved by RNP self-dispatch

1 High redispatch volumes and balancing costs


2 Reliance on countertrading and European TSOs

3 **Inefficient scheduling of storage assets**

- 3
- The intertemporal constraints for energy-limited units means 'usable' energy of storage assets in periods beyond the balancing window cannot be known with certainty
 - Current scheduling of storage is uncoordinated in relation to network constraints, with storage units both helping and hindering transmission constraints at different times in unpredictable ways
 - In the BM batteries can reverse the contribution they made to the transmission constraint by their own initial schedule. Hence boosting their revenue by not selling or buying actual energy

Illustrative example of battery 'repetitive re-trading'

- Consider a storage unit which has a SoC of 0% and is located behind a constraint.
 - To resolve the constraint, a bid is sent to charge the unit, increasing its SoC for the subsequent periods.
- With its new SoC, the unit now wants to sell the energy, and so it submits a PN.
 - However, the constraint is still active so the energy cannot be physically delivered.
 - A second BOA is sent to the unit to prevent the energy being discharged.
- This dynamic repeats itself for future periods and can continue for the entire constraint period.
 - As a result, a higher volume of actions are required to resolve the constraint, increasing consumer costs.



NESO analysis found that the total consumer cost of this behaviour £136.3m for the period November 2024 to October 2025 (£59.5m of wholesale costs and £76.8m of balancing costs)


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 - 315TWh of demand

Dispatch reform: Options

Types of dispatch arrangements

The main differences between dispatch arrangements are around how the scheduling and dispatch positions of units are set, and how any misalignment between those positions and the physical needs of the system are resolved. The greater the misalignment, the more re-dispatch will be needed.



A Self

- Market participants are allowed to trade between each other, without reference to the System Operator
- They optimise their own schedules and dispatch positions to maximise profit and to manage risk
- The System Operator re-dispatches from the final market positions to meet physical needs at lowest cost of deviation
- Price signals can be used to incentivise market participants to trade in ways that align to system needs (e.g. imbalance & locational pricing)

B Hybrid


- Typically uses self-dispatch as the starting point, for some or all assets
- System Operator then has a formal balancing role at an earlier stage, either:
 - in parallel to the market, or
 - taking over from the market participants
- e.g. early re-dispatch, market restrictions, taking over balance responsibility

C Central

- Market participants transact through a centralised market run by the System Operator
- Schedules and dispatch position are decided through a centralised market algorithm
- Aim to minimise the overall cost of meeting energy and system needs
- Minimal re-dispatch is needed, as the previous steps directly reflect the physical needs of the system
- Incentives are focused on units following the dispatch positions


Self-dispatch

No market incentives to align dispatch to network capability, nor restrictions to do so




Central dispatch

Only the best-priced units which are aligned to the system needs are dispatched




Hybrid-dispatch

System Operator engages in early re-dispatch and/or market restrictions



Hybrid-dispatch

System Operator engages in early re-dispatch and/or market restrictions



Dispatch reform


Areas where we think Dispatch reform could help:

- 1. SSEP and associated siting levers:** providing operational signals and arrangements for using assets economically and efficiently across the network
- 2. Constraint Management:** facilitating better pre-Gate Closure management, more efficiently utilising storage assets around constraints, and better align and manage interconnector flows.
- 3. RNP balancing reforms:** creating earlier alignment between the market position and the needs of the system

Status of dispatch reform in RNP

- As part of the 2024 REMA Autumn update, DESNZ adopted a minded-to position not to take forward central dispatch.
- However, given the challenges outlined previously, NESO, DESNZ and Ofgem will continue to explore a range of dispatch reform options with a view to improving system operability and reducing costs for consumers.
- Any reform to dispatch arrangements must satisfactorily address a number of key requirements, including: delivering benefits for consumers, ensuring future system operability, maintaining investor confidence, and ensuring compatibility with the Government's legal obligations and international agreements
- **We are seeking views from stakeholders on the case for Dispatch Reform in the Call for Input.**

BREAK



Agenda

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<i>Informal lunch and networking (optional)</i>		12:00 – 13:00
Welcome	Lizzie Blaxland (NESO)	13:00 – 13:05
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DESNZ RNP Update

Simon Rickenbach (DESNZ)

Constraint Management Markets Update and Demand for Constraints

Saskia Barker & Alifa Starlika
(NESO)

What's next on NESO Constraints Management Measures?


Key questions:

Short Term Constraint Management Markets: This would involve NESO taking actions while the wholesale market is active. How can we mitigate the risk to consumers this presents?

Short Term Constraint Management Markets: If mitigations like a prohibition on trading in the intraday market were put in place to avoid NESO CMM actions being unwound in the wholesale market, how many providers would still be interested in participating in a short term CMM? Are there other mitigations that would be more effective?

Demand for Constraints: How many providers and assets are interested in the Demand for Constraints market? How can we improve liquidity of this new market?

NESO is working to reduce thermal constraint costs across three driving factors



*This list is non-exhaustive


Background

Between January and February 2024, NESO ran the [constraints collaboration project](#) (CCP) with the industry to find solutions for thermal constraints, which could be implemented and deliver results in the short term.


1. Constraints Management Markets (CMM)		2. Increasing how much can flow over boundaries		
1A. Demand for Constraints / Long-term CMM	1B. Short-term Constraints Management Markets	2A. Extended intertrip scheme 2B. Grid booster (post fault)	2C. Boundary flow smoothing: Pre-fault	
Increasing demand for power in constrained areas for electrification of heat	Constraints management markets (CMMs)	Extended intertrip scheme	Grid booster	Transfer booster
Flex PtX to produce green H ₂ and related derivatives	Long-term contract to manage a portion of the forecast constraint volumes	Pre gate closure constraint management product using schedule 7 trade	Intertrip scheme utilisation	Paired storage systems across key boundaries
Demand signal product	Competitively allocated season ahead constraint management availability contracts	Competitively allocated short-term constraint management contracts (D-7)	Enhance utilisation of transmission network	Flexibility for Active Network Management (ANM) zones and Generation Export Management (GEMS)
Incentivising new discretionary demand (H ₂ production and electricity storage)	Long-term auction of excess wind	Discounted demand turn up	Battery for constraints: Reducing the line rating from 10 to 3 mins	
'COOLER HEATING' – commercial heat loads as responsive assets		Weekly generation turn down market	Key <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Demand for Constraints CMM – Long term CMM – Short term Increasing how much can flow over boundaries 	
Long-term constraint management contracts (incentivising new demand)	The 'Big Friendly Battery' for ~8 hours duration			

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


Status Quo



E = Energy **R** = Reserve & response **C** = Constraints

Short term Constraint Management Markets



(E) = Energy **(R)** = Reserve & response **(C)** = Constraints

Short term Constraint Management Markets

Pros


- Could deliver reduced constraint costs (assuming units in front of constraints are able to provide lower price in exchange for certainty)
- Could deliver operability benefit for NESO if it reduces the number of redispatch actions required after gate closure

Cons

- Because the wholesale market is still open, parties could trade away positions agreed with NESO
- Potential impact on wholesale market prices
- Uncertainty of carbon impacts


National Price

No market incentives to align dispatch to network capability, nor restrictions to do so




Short term CMM (in theory)

System Operator engages in early re-dispatch and/or market restrictions




Short term CMM (in practice)

System Operator engages in early re-dispatch and/or market restrictions



An illustrative example of CMM impact on the wholesale market



Risk and Design Mitigations

Risks

- Because a short-term CMM would involve NESO taking energy actions while the wholesale market is open, there is a risk that NESO takes an action in the CMM, and that a party then trades with someone else in the wholesale market, undoing NESO's action
- To reduce balancing costs, the CMM would require parties NESO would have instructed in the balancing mechanism to agree to a lower price because of the certainty they gained from being instructed earlier. If instead parties who would have cleared in the wholesale market decide to participate in the CMM, this could increase wholesale market prices, and therefore potentially increase overall consumer costs

Potential Mitigations

- Require parties who participate in the CMM to fix their positions, preventing them from trading in the wholesale market within day
- Require parties who participate in the CMM to provide unit level wholesale market data to enable wholesale market interactions, and consumer costs, to be understood ex-post. This is in line with the RNP balancing reform proposals

Short Term CMM Questions

Questions

- Have we identified all of the risks associated with introducing a short term CMM and do you agree with how the risks have been articulated?
- Are there other mitigations that could be incorporated into the CMM design to mitigate the risks identified more effectively?
- Would providers still be interested in participating in a constraint management market if mitigations like a prohibition on intraday trading was part of the design?

Long-term CMM: Demand for Constraints (Dfc)

High level design of DfC

Demand for Constraints

Definition

A long-term contract to procure **additional flexible final demand***, which provides dedicated capacity able to increase electricity consumption at times of thermal constraints following NESO's instruction.

Final Demand means electricity which is consumed other than for the purposes of generation or export onto the electricity network.

Purpose

To incentivise new, flexible demand capacity in constrained areas to alleviate thermal constraints.

Eligibility

DfC supports providers' business cases to invest in demand creation that can be operational within a set contract delivery window. Demand creation means additional electricity use that would not otherwise occur.

- **Existing demand assets** that currently not operational but could return to service to provide flexible demand capability;
- **Existing demand assets** that are connected, constructed and with the potential to create additional flexible demand;
- **New demand assets** to be constructed and connected through the connection application process – these demand assets must be flexible on top of their demand baseline.

We intend to incentivise demand that will be used for meaningful, beneficial activities that supports efficient system actions.

Our minded-to position is that demand in an aggregated BMU connects via a single Grid Supply Point.**

*Source: CUSC Direction

**We welcome your feedback through the RFI.




High level design of DfC

	Demand for Constraints
Proposed commercial design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MW Capacity payment: contribution towards new investment required to deliver additional capacity for DfC (£/MW). • Utilisation: Assets are BM registered, dispatched through BOA in merit order and paid a utilisation fee (£/MWh) when utilised. • Performance monitoring: penalty applicable for poor delivery based on performance monitoring rules (to be developed).
Delivery window	<p>Tender process in 2026, for service delivery window from 2028 to 2040</p> <p>Contract length is subject to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimum years for consumer-value return, based on NESO in-house CBA. • Industrial feedback via the RFI based on technology types and business case need. • New assets' connection date.
Delivery approach and timeline	<p>Delivery approach and timeline will depend on operational readiness of existing and new assets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refurbished assets at an existing demand facility to be operational by 2028 or later. • New demand connections with 2026/2027 protected transmission offers, to be operational by 2028 or later. • New demand assets that have not submitted connection application and could participate in the market after 2028 and within the service delivery window.
Location	Scotland network only, focusing on constrained boundaries.
Service retirement	All contracts are planned to end by 2040 at the latest. All assets are in BM and after 2040 they can participate in other NESO markets and in wholesale market.

Dispatch Mechanism

The contracted capacity for DfC should be available at all times and cannot be contracted for any other services which would impact the delivery of DfC unless notified otherwise




*NESO minded to position is to issue notice if there are no constraint need forecasted. The exact timing on when notice is released is yet to be decided

E = Energy **R** = Reserve & response **C** = Constraints

Participating in other markets

If no constraint needs are forecasted, NESO intends to issue a notice at Day Ahead to release units from their DfC contract. This would allow units to use that capacity in other markets



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E = Energy
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Voluntary Request for Info (RFI)

Key Ask of EMAC

- NESO are keen to hear your views about DfC so we can continue to develop it collaboratively
 - How many providers and assets that would be interested in the Demand for Constraints market?
 - How can we improve liquidity of this new market?
- Information received will be used to refine NESO's understanding of the potential market liquidity available to a Demand for Constraints service, and to gather feedback on the technical design and gather information to refine commercial design of the service

How to participate in the RFI?

- [The RFI](#) are now live and accessible on the NESO website
- The RFI will be open to responses for four weeks
- Details on how to respond are be included in [the RFI documentation](#)

Key Milestone	Date
RFI Launch	5 th March 2026
RFI Deadline	1 st April 2026

Note: This is a Request for Information (RFI) only and not part of a formal tender process. **A contract will not be awarded through a response to this RFI.**

Preview of the Operability Strategy Report and Electricity Markets Roadmap


Thomas Pownall

Agenda

Purpose of today's session

1	Purpose of each document
2	Acting of EMAC feedback
3	Publication plan
4	Ask: EMAC feedback once published

Purpose of each document

The title card for the Operability Strategy Report features the text 'Operability Strategy Report' in white, bold, sans-serif font. The background is a dark, atmospheric photograph of a forest with sunlight filtering through the trees, creating a pattern of light and shadow on the ground.

Operability Strategy Report

The title card for the Electricity Markets Roadmap features the text 'Electricity Markets Roadmap' in white, bold, sans-serif font. The background is a bright, sunny photograph of a dirt road winding through a lush green field with trees in the distance.

Electricity Markets Roadmap

Objectives

- ↳ Sets out NESO's view of future operability needs of the electricity system.
- ↳ Outlines medium to long-term risks and opportunities for electricity system operability.
- ↳ Provides recommendations to ensure secure, efficient and overall lowest cost.

Objectives

- ↳ Sets out the strategic direction for NESO markets.
- ↳ Summarises NESO market reform activities and outlines why they are needed.
- ↳ Ensures stakeholders are confident in the market reforms we are making.

Purpose of each document

OSR details operability needs, MR details reforms



Why read both?

- Written as a logical story, from OSR to MR
- The OSR providing the operability needs
- The MR illustrating how we'll meet these needs
- In tandem, they provide a holistic vision of how we identify our requirements and the steps we take to meet these

What will the reader takeaway?

- How NESO calculates our operability requirements
- The means that NESO can utilise to meet these (focused on markets)
- Confidence in the market reforms we are undertaking

Feedback from last years EMAC

You said,

We did

Greater alignment between publications

- We have taken a greater focus on alignment this year.
- Expect this to continue into future publications

Enhance accessibility of document to our customers and service providers

- The website has been updated to make it easier for our customers and service providers to navigate
- We'll seek feedback to improve this further

Link the two publications to wider strategic priorities

- Greater emphasis on facilitating NESO's wider strategic objectives e.g., Clean Power
- Agreement on key messages across publications

Demonstrate NESO's independence

- Focused on areas within NESO's remit
- Clarity on NESO / wider institution roles e.g., RNP's Cfl

Make the publication more concise

- Synthesised the Electricity Markets Roadmap
- Better use of annexes e.g., OSR's System Conditions
- Greater signposting to key NESO documents

Seek greater profile for the reports and collect feedback from industry on the publications

- Extensive comms plan developed

Publication plan

Our proposed approach ensures familiarity and consistency for our stakeholders as well as an enhanced user experience by reducing the lengths of the publications and putting information common to both on a webpage. This will be developed into a one stop shop for system operability plans and the resultant markets strategy.



New content

Operability Strategy Report: Holistic operability risks and opportunities

Electricity Markets Roadmap: Demand-side flexibility, Power Responsive, alignment to RNP



Closer integration

OSR and Electricity Markets Roadmap teams have designed the documents in parallel, representing a consistent house style for our readers

New webpage hosting both publications



More streamlined and condensed

Reduce the number of pages in both documents, by:

- Shifting information to a new webpage and referring to other publications e.g., the Balancing Costs Report



Focus on Feedback

Following 2026's publication, we are planning an extensive collection of feedback to understand our customer needs.

This can provide steer on how to communicate 2027's publication

Publication plan:

- 30th March
- On this new [website](#)
- Q&A at upcoming [Markets Forum on the 28th of April](#)

Ask: EMAC feedback

We want to ensure that our publications are valuable to industry.

As such, we always seek feedback

Ideally, when published, we would like to hear:

- Do you see value in these reports? If so, where?
- Are there areas we should focus on? Or not?
- How can we better communicate these publications to industry?

Welcome opportunity for further discussions on feedback

Contact details:

box.market.dev@neso.energy

Thank you