Public

| CUSC Modification Proposal Form | |
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| **CMP470: Introducing an Oversubscribed Technologies Commitment Fee**<br><br>**Overview**: This modification seeks to introduce a floor on securities through an Oversubscribed Technologies Commitment Fee for all technologies which are oversubscribed relative to Clean Power 2030 capacity targets. | **Modification process & timetable**<br><br>1 **Proposal Form** 20 March 2026<br>2 **Workgroup Consultation** 20 April 2026 – 24 April 2026<br>3 **Workgroup Report** 22 May 2026<br>4 **Code Administrator Consultation** 26 May 2026 – 02 June 2026<br>5 **Draft Final Modification Report** 26 June 2026<br>6 **Final Modification Report** 30 June 2026<br>7 **Implementation** TBC |
| **Status summary**: The Proposer has raised a modification and is seeking a decision from the Panel on the governance route to be taken. | |
| **This modification is expected to have a: High impact** on generation developers and a **Medium Impact** on Transmission Owners | |
| **Proposer's recommendation of governance route**<br>Urgent modification to proceed under a timetable agreed by the Authority (with an Authority decision) | **Modification Category**<br>CUSC Non-Charging Objectives |
| **Who can I talk to about the change?** | **Proposer:**<br>Andrew Enzor<br>Andrew.enzor@field.energy<br><br>**Code Administrator Contact:**<br>Cusc.team@neso.energy |

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## What is the issue?

The two primary intended benefits of Connections Reform, as stated by Ofgem in its 15 April 2025 decision[1] were:

- *"More efficient network planning, build and connections – Network companies will have improved clarity on the projects that are 'ready' and 'needed'… This will result in more focused, efficient network planning…"*
- *"Increased investor confidence for ready and needed projects – Following reform, new entrants will have a clearer signal about what technologies to invest in and where to locate… Existing projects with 'Gate 2' offers will have increased confidence that the required network will be built, due to the more efficient network planning, and their project will be able to connect on time…"*

These were intended to be achieved by reducing the connections queue to only the subset of projects which were "ready" and "needed". Those projects would receive Gate 2 Offers and the network would subsequently be designed to accommodate precisely those projects.

The National Energy System Operator (NESO) introduced a series of "protections" for projects which have, in some instances, led to a greater volume of projects being expected to receive Gate 2 Offers than the target capacity in the Clean Power 2030 (CP30) Action Plan. For example, all projects with planning consent (that were submitted prior to 20 Dec 2024) are protected and so will receive Gate 2 Offers, even if the target capacity in the CP30 Action Plan is exceeded.

Planning permission to protect projects sets a relatively low bar. Real-world development considerations like third-party land rights, ground conditions, onerous planning conditions, deliveries of abnormal indivisible loads (for larger projects) etc and financing considerations like revenue forecasts, asset availability, extent of Transmission Owner (TO) works, network charges, offtake agreements and lending terms are also relevant to determine whether a project

[1] https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/decision/decision-connections-reform-package-tm04

can proceed. “Ready” as defined in grid connection reform is not the same as ready to construct in project development terms.

In the case of Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS), protections have led to significant oversubscription. NESO has identified that over 90GW (Gigawatt) of BESS capacity is built or will receive Gate 2 Offers[2] against a 2035 target of 29GW[3].

The oversubscription is likely to increase as further protected projects come forward. Projects which submitted planning prior to 20 December 2024 and which are consented after the closure of the Gate 2 evidence submission window in August 2025 are protected in a future Gated Application Window, which the Proposer estimates (based on analysis of Solar Media’s pipeline database as at March 2026) will add a further 12GW of battery storage to the oversubscription.

Other technologies are not currently materially oversubscribed but may become so when protections are applied in future Gated Application Windows.

For solar, 69GW are built or will receive a Gate 2 Offer, precisely meeting the target in the Clean Power 2030 Action Plan. A further 4GW could be protected in future Gated Application Windows (based on analysis of Solar Media’s pipeline database as of March 2026), introducing a small oversubscription. Onshore wind is similar, albeit slightly undersubscribed currently and potentially becoming oversubscribed by 1GW.

For BESS in particular, there are materially more projects receiving Gate 2 Offers than are “needed”. There are also materially more projects than are likely economic in the market. NESO and TOs are therefore planning the network for more projects than are needed or will be developed, undermining the first objective above. It also means that projects with Gate 2 Offers do not have increased confidence as intended because they continue to be stuck behind other projects in the queue. Some of the best projects - the ones that are

[2] https://www.neso.energy/document/374936/download

[3] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67f3b417d3f1efd2ce2ab8a5/clean-power-2030-action-plan-connections-reform-annex-update.pdf

genuinely ready to enter construction - will still be stuck behind projects that may not be able to resolve issues and remain financially attractive.

NESO has no mechanism to reduce the queue from the volume of projects which receive Gate 2 Offers down to the volume "needed". The market will likely deliver that outcome in the long-term. For BESS, most market forecasters project less than 25GW by 2030 based on economic dispatch models; significantly more than that volume will cannibalise revenues and not be economic. Waiting for the market to take its course to reduce from 90GW to ~25GW is effectively reverting to the pre-TMO4+ (Target Model Option 4 Plus) paradigm in which NESO and TOs have no certainty on which projects will connect, and the best projects are held up behind other projects holding queue positions and preventing effective delivery.

Crucially, this is not only a problem for oversubscribed technologies themselves. As soon as one technology is oversubscribed, the objective of connections reform to enable the TOs to have high confidence of which projects will connect and can therefore build out the network to accommodate them fails. The TOs either:

- Assume all projects (including oversubscribed) will connect, with the network designed and built to accommodate them. This results in far more connection bays being planned than are required.
- Assume attrition, in which case TOs no longer have confidence on which subset of projects from the queue of oversubscribed technology will connect, preventing the level of certainty required to build out the network

Either of these options will slow down connections for all projects.

**Why change?**

It would be harmful to investor confidence for NESO to change protections introduced by CMP434 and CMP435, either retrospectively or for protections which have not yet been realised. Reneging on connection contracts once was harmful enough; doing so twice would be unwise. So, another mechanism is needed to reduce the capacity of oversubscribed technologies down to the level required more quickly than the market alone will deliver.

The primary reasons for change therefore are two-fold:

There is **insufficient incentive on projects which receive Gate 2 Offers but which are either not buildable or economically attractive to leave the queue**. In fact, the value placed on a Gate 2 Offer incentivises unviable projects to remain in the queue for as long as possible, to "buy time" to resolve problems or in the hope of improved project economics.

Many projects have very low cancellation charges and securities, particularly in the earlier stages of development. For example, projects which will use a pre-existing substation bay will likely have zero securities prior to trigger date (at which point wider securities are applied). Remaining in the queue is therefore a free option for projects with the most attractive grid connections. Some of those projects will not be viable but currently face no incentive to leave the queue until progression milestones bite and/or securities ramp up closer to connection.

Even projects with complex attributable works can have low cancellation charges and securities by opting for a fixed security profile that is capped at £3k/MW until the Trigger Date.

There is no mechanism by which **NESO can select the most viable projects from those which are protected**. The connections methodologies treat all projects with planning consent as equally viable. That does not reflect commercial reality – some projects with planning consent will be more economic than others; it is in consumers interest for the most economic to proceed.

The most economic projects may naturally come to the fore over time as less viable projects leave the queue, either as securities ramp closer to connection or queue management milestones bite. That is a slow solution, effectively recreating pre-TMO4+ arrangements. During that time, TOs will design networks for a large cohort of projects, only a subset of which will connect.

A financial mechanism to more quickly reduce oversubscription will deliver a better outcome for consumers.

## What is the Proposer's solution?

To introduce an Oversubscribed Technologies Commitment Fee (OTCF), required to be fully securitised.

The OTCF would apply to all projects in an oversubscribed technology type as an addition to the cancellation charge. It would be required to be fully secured.

The level of the OTCF will be calculated on a project-specific basis and will fluctuate over time in each biannual cancellation charge statement. It will be set at a level which ensures that the total security to be placed for each project of the relevant technology type is not less than a defined securities floor. For projects with securities already exceeding the floor, the OTCF will not apply. For those with securities below the floor, the OTCF will act as a "top-up" to the cancellation charge, calculated to set the total security required to be equal to the floor.

Ahead of each bi-annual securities statement, NESO would assess and publish the total capacity of each technology which:

- Is operational
- Has a countersigned Gate 2 Connection Agreement
- Has received but not yet accepted a Gate 2 Connection Offer
- Is expected to receive a Gate 2 Offer following a recent Gated Application Window, but where that Gate 2 Offer has not yet been issued (for example, as of March 2026 all Gate 2, Phase 1 and Gate 2, Phase 2 projects from Gate 2 to the Whole Queue which NESO has identified it will issue a Gate 2 Offer to but has not yet done so)

The total in each technology will include the contribution to that technology from projects which co-locate that technology with other technologies and will include both transmission and distribution connected projects.

For initial application of the OTCF, the total capacity would be compared to the prevailing long-term capacity target at the time, currently the 2035 permitted capacity in the CP30 Action Plan. A 50% tolerance on oversubscription would be applied before the OTCF takes effect. The OTCF would therefore take effect when

the total operational and Gate 2 capacity exceeds the targeted capacity multiplied by 1.5. On initial application, the securities floor will be set at £10k/MW(Megawatt).

Once activated, the OTCF (and associated securities floor) will be re-evaluated ahead of each bi-annual securities statement. The total operational and Gate 2 capacity could fall in (a combination of) two ways:

- Projects leave the queue, reducing or removing the oversubscription
- The capacity target for that technology increases, for example if the Strategic Spatial Energy Plan (SSEP) increases the capacity target

Once activated, ahead of each subsequent bi-annual securities statement, NESO will evaluate the proportional change in oversubscription since the previous securities statement.

- If the sum of operational and Gate 2 capacity falls below an oversubscription of 25%, the OTCF will be disapplied for that technology
- If the oversubscription has reduced by more than 25% since the previous securities statement, the securities floor will not change
- If the oversubscription has reduced by less than 25% since the previous securities statement, or if the oversubscription has increased, the securities floor will increase by £5k/MW, up to a cap of £25k/MW

The OTCF would apply to projects of the relevant technology until energisation, including those which co-locate that technology with other technologies. As with the Project Commitment Fee introduced by CMP448, the OTCF will apply to Small, Medium and Large (as defined in the Grid Code) distribution connected generation who are themselves party to agreements under Connection and Use of System Code (CUSC) or are otherwise captured through the CUSC process which evaluates the impact of such connections on the National Electricity Transmission System (NETS) and the agreements with the distribution network operators.

Worked example of securities floor level

The following is a worked example of how the OTCF could be activated and a securities floor calculated for a given technology. It is based on **illustrative** capacities with Gate 2 Offers and **illustrative** capacity targets, albeit with a starting point of the potential position for BESS in January 2027.

**January 2027 statements (April 2027 to September 2027 securities period):**

- Total capacity: 90GW, broken down as:
    - Operational: 7.5GW
    - Gate 2 Agreements Signed: 34.5GW
    - Gate 2 Offers issued, not yet accepted: 25GW
    - Gate 2 Offers expected but not yet issued: 23GW
- Capacity Target: 29GW
- Oversubscription: 61GW, 210%

Outcome:

- Oversubscription greater than 50%, so OTCF is activated
- This is the first activation, so securities floor set at £10k/MW

**July 2027 statements (October 2027 to March 2028 securities period):**

- Total capacity: 80GW, broken down as:
    - Operational: 10GW
    - Gate 2 Agreements Signed: 60GW (reduced by attrition)
    - Gate 2 Offers issued, not yet accepted: 10GW (3a protections)
- Capacity Target: 29GW (unchanged)
- Oversubscription: 51GW, 176%

Outcome:

- Oversubscription remains greater than 25%, so OTCF remains active.
- Oversubscription has reduced from 61GW to 51GW, a reduction of 16%. This is less than 25%, so the securities floor increases to £15k/MW

**January 2028 (April 2028 to September 2028 securities period):**

- Total capacity: 60GW, broken down as:
    - Operational: 12.5GW
    - Gate 2 Agreements Signed: 45GW (reduced by attrition)
    - Gate 2 Offers issued, not yet accepted: 2.5GW (remaining 3a protections)
- Capacity target: 40GW (increased by SSEP)
- Oversubscription: 20GW, 50%

Outcome:

- Oversubscription remains greater than 25%, so OTCF remains active.
- Oversubscription has reduced from 51GW to 20GW, a reduction of 61%. This is more than 25%, so the securities floor remains £15k/MW

**July 2028 (October 2028 to March 2029 securities period)**

- Total capacity: 45GW
    - Operational: 15GW
    - Gate 2 Agreements Signed: 30GW (reduced from previous iteration by attrition)
    - Gate 2 Offers issued, not yet accepted: 0GW (protections exhausted)
- Capacity target: 40GW (unchanged)
- Oversubscription: 5GW, 12.5%

Outcome:

- Oversubscription less than 25%, so OTCF de-activated

Worked example of application of securities floor

This example applies the above profile of a securities floor to an illustrative project with:

- 1 January 2030 Charging Date
- Maximum wider liability of £10k/MW
- Maximum attributable liability of £50k/MW

Assuming this is a Gate 2 BESS, it will have already secured key consents, so will be required to place securities for 10% of the total cancellation charge (attributable cancellation charge plus wider cancellation charge).

Using the worked example above, the OTCF would be activated in April 2027 with security floor at £10k/MW, rising to £15k/MW from October 2027 and being removed in October 2028. An additional cancellation charge and security would be required to bring securities up to those values.

From 1 April 2027, the profile of liabilities and securities could be as shown in the table and charts below:

| Cancellation Charge and Securities Profile (£k/MW) | Apr-27 | Oct-27 | Apr-28 | Oct-28 | Apr-29 | Oct-29 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Wider Cancellation Charge** | 5.0 | 5.0 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| **Attributable Cancellation Charge** | 20.0 | 30.0 | 35.0 | 47.5 | 47.5 | 50.0 |
| **Total Cancellation Charge** | 25.0 | 35.0 | 42.5 | 55.0 | 57.5 | 60.0 |
| **Security required without OTCF** | 2.5 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.0 |
| **OTCF** | 7.5 | 11.5 | 10.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| **Security with OTCF** | 10.0 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.0 |






Key design considerations

**Activation threshold**: This modification proposes that the OTCF is activated only when oversubscription has exceeded a 50% tolerance. This is intended to avoid an over-correction whereby the OTCF drives an oversubscription to an undersubscription. This threshold also means that we expect the OTCF will only apply to BESS in the short and medium term.

**National or regional application**: The Proposer has considered whether the oversubscription should be calculated on a national or regional basis. This modification proposes national for two reasons:

- Protections for projects with planning consent (with application submitted prior to 20 December 2024) apply even if the project exceeds national targets, regardless of regional targets
- Regional targets and project pipelines are relatively small. Hence there is potential for significant instability, with a small number of projects driving movements between significant oversupply and undersupply. This would risk a volatile OTCF which would be unhelpful

**Deactivation threshold**: This modification proposes that, once activated, the OTCF is removed only when the oversubscription falls below a 25% tolerance. This introduces a deadband, intended to avoid introducing a situation where the OTCF switches on and off repeatedly in quick succession driven by minor changes in capacity and/or the capacity target.

**Timing of application to projects**: This modification proposes that the OTCF applies to all projects of the relevant technology with a Gate 2 Offer up until energisation. The Proposer also considered:

- Time-limiting application to five years ahead of connection, but following industry feedback concluded that application at all stages is more appropriate
- Disapplying at milestone M8. The Proposer recommends energisation to avoid gaming risk on construction start (for example as observed in relation to the Capacity Market Financial Completion Milestone)

**Initial level of the OTCF/securities floor**: This modification proposes a starting level securities floor of £10k/MW. The Proposer has considered a fixed amount per project, potentially varying by voltage, which may better reflect the implications of projects requiring a bay regardless of MW size, thus placing a higher burden on smaller projects for use of a bay. The Proposer ultimately opted for a £/MW level for ease of implementation.

**Ramping over time**: Increasing by £5k/MW every six months unless the oversubscription reduces by more than 25%. The initial level is set to ensure that projects with zero securities under status quo face a meaningful commitment without an excessive burden. Subsequent increases only take place if the oversubscription is not coming down quickly to avoid an over-correction. If the oversubscription is coming down quickly, the securities floor will not change; if the oversubscription remains high, the securities floor will increase by £5k/MW up to a maximum of £25k/MW. It would take at least two years for securities to reach that level; if the oversubscription remains high in two years, the Proposer expects that the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) and NESO would already have implemented additional measures.

**Floor or addition to securities**: This modification proposes the OTCF acts as a floor on securities. This ensures that all projects are required to place a material security to remain in the queue, without placing excessive burden on those projects which already have high security requirements.

**Application to co-located projects**: This modification proposes that the OTCF is applied to all projects which include the relevant technology, including those which co-located that technology with others.

**Interaction with the existing Project Commitment Fee (PCF)**: CMP448 has already implemented a PCF. The Proposer anticipates the new oversubscription technology commitment fee will, in theory, apply in addition to the existing PCF. In reality, the two are very unlikely to ever apply to the same project. The PCF, if triggered in future, will apply to projects prior to submitting planning and is not applicable post submitting a planning application. Oversubscription is driven by protections, typically requiring planning consent. Projects to which the OCTF will apply will likely already have planning consent, so effectively be exempt from the PCF. If necessary, a "backstop" provision could be included to ensure only one of the two applies to any single project.

**Draft legal text**

CMP448 introduced a PCF via small additions throughout Section 15 of CUSC referring to the PCF and a new sub-section defining the triggers for the PCF. This modification proposes a similar approach, with additions to Section 15 to add the OTCF to cancellation charges and securities, and a new sub-section defining the details of when the OTCF will be triggered and how it will be calculated.

## What is the impact of this change?

The change will directly impact developers of projects which receive and accept Gate 2 Offers and are a technology which is oversubscribed relative to the 2035 capacity target in the Clean Power 2030 Action Plan. It would expose those developers to higher cancellation charges and securities.

In the medium-term, it will positively impact all developers and TOs, by removing projects of oversubscribed technologies from the queue and reducing the oversubscription. In turn, this will enable TOs to move faster and with greater certainty on network design and buildout, increasing the rate of progress on connections for all technologies.

| Proposer's assessment against CUSC Non-Charging Objectives | |
|---|---|
| **Relevant Objective** | **Identified impact** |
| (i) The efficient discharge by the Licensee of the obligations imposed on it by the Act and by this licence*; | **Neutral**<br>No impact |
| (ii) Facilitating effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity, and (so far as consistent therewith) facilitating such competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity; | **Positive**<br>There is limited competitive pressure on relatively uneconomic projects with Gate 2 Offers to leave the queue and enable more economic projects with Gate 2 Offers to progress. This change introduces an economic incentive for developers of less viable projects to leave the queue and for developers of the best projects to remain, better facilitating competition between developers. |
| (iii) Compliance with the Electricity Regulation and any relevant legally binding decision of the European Commission and/or the Agency **; and | **Neutral**<br>No impact |
| (iv) Promoting efficiency in the implementation and administration of the CUSC arrangements. | **Positive**<br>NESO is currently dealing with more Gate 2 Offers than are needed. This change will reduce the number of Connection Agreements for BESS, improving efficiency in delivery of connections reform. |

** See Electricity System Operator Licence*

***The Electricity Regulation referred to in objective (iii) is Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the*

*internal market for electricity (recast) as it has effect immediately before IP completion day as read with the modifications set out in the SI 2020/1006.*

| Proposer's assessment **of the impact of the modification on the stakeholder / consumer benefit categories** | |
|---|---|
| **Stakeholder / consumer benefit categories** | **Identified impact** |
| Improved safety and reliability of the **system** | **Neutral** |
| Lower bills than would otherwise be the **case** | **Positive**<br>This change will have a two-fold impact on consumer bills:<br>(i) Where a technology is oversubscribed, it will create a mechanism whereby the least economic projects are removed from the queue and the most economic progress. That will result in an overall lower cost system<br>(ii) Removing oversubscription will enable TOs to move more quickly on designing and building network connections for new projects, bringing them online sooner, increasing margins in the electricity market, and reducing prices |
| Benefits for society as a **whole** | **Neutral** |
| Reduced environmental **damage** | **Positive**<br>Progress towards Clean Power 2030 has effectively stalled while NESO and TOs work on issuing connection agreements post connections reform. This change will remove key remaining blockers (namely the overdesign of network to connect oversubscribed |

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| | technologies) and thus enable progress towards Clean Power 2030 to accelerate more quickly once connection offers are issued.<br>The change should also reduce the number and magnitude of new substations required, as the most economic projects are likely to connect at existing substations. That in turn reduces the impact on local communities and environments in the areas where those substations are no longer needed. |
| Improved quality of **service** | **Neutral** |

## When will this change take place?

**Implementation date: 1 January 2027**

1 January 2027 implementation is required to ensure that the OTCF can be included in the January 2027 securities statements for the April 2027 to September 2027 period - being the first round of securities statements after the majority of Gate 2 Offers will have been issued.

**Date decision required by: 1 August 2026**

A decision is required as soon as possible, but in any case by 1 August 2026. NESO has indicated that Gate 2, Phase 1 offers for 2028 to 2030 projects will be issued in the window from mid-May to mid-September 2026. With a three-month acceptance period, the earliest of those will need to be accepted (or will lapse) in mid-August 2026, assuming offers start to be issued promptly in mid-May.

An Ofgem decision is required before those projects sign their connection agreements, so that the implications of the upcoming increase in securities which this change would introduce can be factored into developers' decision making. This gives developers an opportunity to exit the queue without incurring cancellation charges by not signing their Gate 2 Offer.

With this deadline, if a customer was issued their Gate 2 offer at the beginning of the window (i.e. in mid-May), they would have two weeks remaining in the

window to accept their offer. However, based on NESO's issuing of offers to date, it is unlikely that the bulk of offers will be issued at the beginning of this window. Developers will also have visibility of the mod as it develops, so will be able to consider options based on, for example, the solution (and any alternatives) presented to Ofgem in the Final Modification Report.

**Implementation approach**

Some NESO tools may need to be updated, potentially alongside those for the Distribution Network Operators (DNOs).

**Proposer's justification for governance route**

Governance route: **Urgent modification to proceed under a timeline agreed by the Authority (with an Authority Decision)**

If not quickly addressed, the issue of oversubscription will have a significant commercial impact on all developers of oversubscribed technologies, developers of other technologies, and in turn on end consumers.

- Developers of oversubscribed technologies: with no incentive for the least economic projects to leave the queue, the best projects are held up
- Developers of other technologies are being repeatedly impacted by delays to issuing connection offers. The most recent of these was published in February 2026, driven in part by "Updated background assumptions … in some locations where the volume of projects at Gate 2 are higher than forecast."[4]
- End consumers will ultimately be impacted by the delay to good projects being able to progress

This has only recently come to light as an imminent issue due to two updates:

- The release of Gate 2 capacity data in January 2026 which revealed the extent of the oversubscription
- The way NESO and TOs are handling Construction Planning Assumptions and network design. We now understand that NESO and TOs are seeking to

[4] https://www.neso.energy/industry-information/connections-reform/connections-reform-timeline#:~:text=Joint%20industry%20statement,NESO

allocate specific connection points to **all** Gate 2 projects, despite a strong likelihood that only ~one third of Gate 2 BESS will connect

In practice, these two factors combined means allocating substation bays to ~90GW of storage projects, even though that much is neither needed nor economically viable in the market. TOs are therefore being forced to design large new substations to accommodate large volumes of BESS **which will never be built**.

Gate 2 Offers being issued over the coming months will be based on a network design which most stakeholders accept bears little resemblance to that which is actually needed. In order to avoid multiple repeats of this process, the queue must be reduced ahead of offers being issued after the next Gated Application Window. Without this change (or an alternative solution), this problem will persist until projects are terminated for failing to meet development milestones – a process which will take several years.

## Interactions

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☐Grid Code | ☐BSC | ☐STC | ☐SQSS |
| ☐European Network Codes | ☐ EBR Article 18 T&Cs[1] | ☐Other modifications | ☐Other |

## Acronyms, key terms and reference material

| Acronym / key term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| BESS | Battery Energy Storage System |
| BSC | Balancing and Settlement Code |
| CP30 | Clean Power 2030 |
| CUSC | Connection and Use of System Code |
| DESNZ | Department for Energy Security and Net Zero |

| | |
|---|---|
| DNOs | Distribution Network Operators |
| EBR | Electricity Balancing Regulation |
| GC | Grid Code |
| NETS | National Electricity Transmission System |
| NESO | National Energy System Operator |
| OTCF | Oversubscribed Technologies Commitment Fee |
| PCF | Project Commitment Fee |
| SQSS | Security and Quality of Supply Standards |
| STC | System Operator Transmission Owner Code |
| T&Cs | Terms and Conditions |
| TMO4 | Target Model Option 4 |
| TMO4+ | Target Model Option 4 Plus |
| SSEP | Strategic Spatial Energy Plan |
| TO | Transmission Owner |